



7 Climate Change

Editorial note:

The current draft will be revised after Eionet review to reflect review comments, strengthen coherence across chapters and improve interlinkages

7.1 Thematic summary assessment

1. Climate change is already happening. Several climate variables, including global and European temperatures and sea level, have repeatedly broken long-term records in recent years. Some changes in the climate system, such as sea level rise, are accelerating. Climate change has also increased the occurrence of several climate and weather extremes, including heat waves, heavy precipitation, floods and droughts, in many regions of Europe.
2. Climate change is creating risks, and limited opportunities, to the environment, the economy and people. These risks are expected to further increase in the future as the climate continues to change, depending on mitigation policies. Europe is also affected by the impacts of climate change outside Europe, which can affect Europe through different pathways, such as trade and migration.
3. In order to limit the adverse effects of climate change, strong mitigation and adaptation efforts are needed. The magnitude and pace of future climate change, and thus the long-term adaptation challenges, depend on the success of global mitigation efforts to keep the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 °C compared with pre-industrial levels and to aim at limiting the increase to 1.5 °C, as stated in the Paris Agreement.
4. EU GHG emissions decreased by about 22 % in the past 25 years due to the combined result of policies and measures and economic factors. As a result, the carbon and energy intensity of the EU economy is lower now than it was in 1990. The transport sector remains a key challenge to decarbonise the economy.
5. The EU remains on track to achieve its GHG emission reduction target of 20% compared to 1990 but is not on track to achieve the EU's target of a 40 % reduction by 2030. Much faster rates of emission reductions would be needed to achieve the EU's objective of an 80-95% reduction by 2050.
6. According to a recent REFIT evaluation, the EU adaptation strategy adopted in 2013 has delivered on most of its objectives. Climate change adaptation is increasingly mainstreamed in EU policies, programmes and strategies, the EU has funded many adaptation-related projects across Europe through LIFE and other programmes, most EEA member countries now have a national adaptation strategy, an increasing number of cities are adopting local adaptation strategies, and Climate-ADAPT facilitates the exchange of knowledge relevant for adaptation across Europe. However, the evaluation also identified areas where further action is needed.
7. The EU is broadly on track towards the target of spending at least 20 % of its budget for 2014–2020 on climate-related actions, but further efforts are needed. This target seems to have triggered a shift in climate-related spending in some policy areas, but not in others.



Theme	Past trends (10-15 years)	Outlooks 2030	Prospects to meet policy objectives /targets		
			2020	2030	2050
Greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation efforts			2020 <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	2030 <input type="checkbox"/>	2050 <input type="checkbox"/>
Climate change and impacts on ecosystems			2020 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Climate change risks to society			2020 <input type="checkbox"/>		
Climate change adaptation efforts			2020 <input type="checkbox"/>		

43 *Explanation of the summary assessment table*

44 Past EU trends in GHG emissions are positive and the 2020 targets are within reach. However,
 45 the 2030 and 2050 targets are more ambitious, and, although emissions are projected to
 46 decrease, the current pace of emission reductions will not be sufficient to meet these targets.
 47 Stronger efforts are needed, also globally. Adverse impacts from climate change on ecosystems
 48 and society have been and are projected to be dominant in most European regions. Continuing
 49 climate change also makes it more difficult to achieve other environmental policy targets (e.g.
 50 on biodiversity protection and water quality). Whereas implementation of climate-change
 51 adaptation is in its early stages in many countries, future action is expected to occur at the EU,
 52 transnational, national and city levels.

53 GHG historic data are based on GHG inventories, which are reported according to UNFCCC and
 54 IPCC Guidelines, and are subject to an international review process. The uncertainty in GHG
 55 projections is higher. The assessment of past climate change and its impacts is based primarily
 56 on direct observations, complemented by other data sources. The aggregated assessment is
 57 considered robust, despite considerable uncertainties about climate change and its impacts on
 58 specific systems and sectors at the regional level. Regarding adaptation, information about
 59 national plans is based on country reporting to the EEA and on an assessment by the European
 60 Commission.

61 **7.2 Scope of the theme**

62 Climate change is a key environmental, economic and social challenge globally and in Europe.
 63 On the one hand, most economic activities are contributing to climate change by emitting
 64 greenhouse gases or affecting carbon sinks (e.g. through land use change); on the other hand,
 65 all ecosystems, many economic activities as well as human health and well-being are sensitive
 66 to climate change.

67 This chapter gives an overview of the causes of climate change, of past and projected changes
 68 in the climate system and of selected impacts on the environment, the economy and people.
 69 Further information on climate change impacts is available in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6. This chapter
 70 also addresses the two fundamental policies to limit the adverse impacts of climate change:
 71 mitigation and adaptation. Both policies can be facilitated by targeted financing.

72 Mitigation of climate change means reducing the emissions of greenhouse gases and enhancing
 73 their sinks. Climate change is a global problem, which requires global action. The global policy
 74 framework comprises the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
 75 the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris agreement (see Section 7.3 for further details). The EU and all
 76 EEA member countries have ratified these international treaties, and they are jointly responsible
 77 for their implementation.



78 Adaptation to climate change involves making adjustments in order to minimize the adverse
 79 impacts of climate change or to exploit any opportunities that may arise. Adaptation comprises
 80 a wide range of measures, including ‘grey adaptation’ (e.g. building coastal protection
 81 infrastructure in response to rising sea levels), ‘green and green-blue adaptation’ (e.g. planting
 82 trees in cities to reduce the urban heat island effect) and ‘soft adaptation’ (e.g. improving
 83 emergency management to deal with natural disasters).

84 7.3 Policy context

85 Mitigation and adaptation are both necessary to limit the risks from climate change. However,
 86 the measures and policies are rather different.

87 Mitigation of climate change has a quantitative target that was agreed at the global level. The
 88 central aim of the Paris Agreement is to keep the global temperature rise well below 2 °C above
 89 pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C. These
 90 global temperature targets correspond directly to remaining carbon budgets, i.e. to the amount
 91 of greenhouse gases that humanity can emit without exceeding a given level of warming. The
 92 EU has implemented many legislative acts aimed at reducing the emissions of the most
 93 important greenhouse gases and at enhancing their sinks (see Table 7.1). One feature of EU’s
 94 domestic climate legislation is that it has the key objective of delivering on the agreed
 95 international commitments by Heads of State. The other feature is the internal consistency
 96 between the quantified efforts required by Member States and the agreed international
 97 objectives binding the EU Member States and the EU as a whole.

98 In contrast, adaptation to climate change is difficult to measure quantitatively, and there is no
 99 single metric for doing so. In fact, the effectiveness of adaptation measures often can only be
 100 assessed after an extreme weather event has happened. As a result, the policy targets for
 101 adaptation at the global and European level are less quantifiable, and monitoring focusses so far
 102 on the adaptation process rather than on quantitative outcomes. In addition to the adaptation
 103 policies and targets mentioned explicitly in Table 7.1, climate change adaptation also requires
 104 ‘mainstreaming’ in many other EU policies addressing climate-sensitive issues. Of particular
 105 relevance are policies for disaster risk reduction (e.g. EU Civil Protection Mechanism, EU Action
 106 Plan on the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction), the Common Agricultural Policy, the
 107 Fisheries Policy, the Floods Directive and the Water Framework Directive, and policies related
 108 to biodiversity protection.

109 Mitigation as well as adaptation are facilitated by a suitable policy framework, adequate
 110 financial resources, and targeted information and knowledge. There are quantified targets for
 111 climate change finance at the global and the European level (see Table 7.1). Interestingly, neither
 112 of these targets distinguishes between mitigation and adaptation. Further support for
 113 adaptation actions in Europe is provided, among others, by the Copernicus Climate Change
 114 Service and dedicated research projects (e.g. under Horizon 2020 and JPI Climate).

115 **Table 7.1 Selected policies and targets related to climate change**

Policy Objectives & Targets	Sources	Target Year	Agreement
Climate change mitigation			
Limit human-induced global temperature rise to well below 2 °C (and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C) above pre-industrial levels	Paris Agreement (UN)	Permanent	Binding International treaty
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels) •20% of EU energy from renewables •20% improvement in energy efficiency To achieve the 20% target:	EU 2020 climate and energy package	2020	Binding GHG target



<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •EU emissions trading system (ETS) sectors would have to cut emissions by 21% (compared to 2005) •non-ETS sectors would need to cut emissions by 10% (compared to 2005) – this is translated into individual binding targets for Member States. 			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •At least 40% cuts in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels) •At least 32% share for renewable energy •At least 32.5% improvement in energy efficiency <p>To achieve the at least 40% target:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •EU emissions trading system (ETS) sectors would have to cut emissions by 43% (compared to 2005) – to this end, the ETS is to be reformed and strengthened •non-ETS sectors would need to cut emissions by 30% (compared to 2005) – this needs to be translated into individual binding targets for Member States. 	EU 2030 climate and energy framework	2030	Binding GHG target
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> •By 2050, the EU should cut greenhouse gas emissions to 80% below 1990 levels •Milestones: 40% emissions cuts by 2030 and 60% by 2040 	EU 2050 low-carbon roadmap	2050	Non-binding commitment
Net-zero GHG emissions	EU strategy for long-term EU greenhouse gas emission reductions	2050	Non-binding commitment
<p>Overarching objectives: secure, competitive and sustainable energy;</p> <p>Specific objectives: expand security of energy supply; connected EU energy market; reducing energy demand and improving energy efficiency; decarbonising the energy mix; and to increase research and development.</p>	Energy Union	2030, 2050	EU strategy
Climate change adaptation			
Decisive progress in adapting to the impact of climate change	7 th EAP (EU)	2020	Non-binding commitment
Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related hazards and natural disasters in all countries	SDG Target 13.1 (UN) ; Paris Agreement (UN)	2030	Non-binding commitment
Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning	SDG Target 13.2 (UN) ; Paris Agreement (UN)	2030	Non-binding commitment
All Member States are encouraged to adopt comprehensive adaptation strategies	EU Strategy on adaptation to climate change (Commission Communication and Council Conclusions)	2017	Non-binding commitment
Climate-proofing EU action: mainstream adaptation measures into EU policies and programmes		N.A.	Non-binding commitment
Climate change finance			
Developed countries shall mobilize jointly U\$ 100 billion annually to address the mitigation and adaptation needs of developing countries	Cancun Pledge (UN), Paris Agreement (UN), SDG Target 13.4 (UN)	2020	International treaty
Climate action objectives will represent at least 20% of EU spending (in the period 2014-2020)	EU Multi-annual financial framework (Commission proposal, endorsed by Council and Parliament)	2014-2020	Non-binding commitment

116 **7.4 Key trends in Europe and in European countries, including outlooks**


117 **7.4.1 Emissions of greenhouse gases and climate change mitigation efforts**

118 [Editorial note: The climate change mitigation sections will be updated, before publication, to
119 include the 2019 GHG inventory submissions and the 2019 MS projections under the EU MMR]

120 **Snapshot of EU's GHG emission trends and projections**

121 Figure 7.1 shows that the total GHG emissions excluding LULUCF and including international
122 aviation have been reduced by 1.3 billion tonnes of CO₂eq between 1990 and 2016. This
123 represents a reduction of 22% in the past 26 years. Although there is a clear trend towards lower
124 GHG emissions in the EU (EEA, 2018b), early GHG estimates for 2017 suggest the EU increased
125 emissions by 0.6% compared to 2016 (EEA, 2018c).

126 **Figure 7.1 GHG emissions trends and projections in the EU-28, 1990-2050**



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128 Note: The GHG emission trends, projections and target calculations include emissions from international aviation,
129 and exclude emissions and removals from the LULUCF sector. The WEM scenario reflects existing policies and
130 measures, whereas the WAM scenario considers the additional effects of planned measures reported by Member
131 States.

132 Source: (EEA, 2018j).

133 The reduction in total GHG emissions since 1990 means that the EU remains on track to meet
134 its 2020 target. However, according to the latest projections reported by Member States (EEA,
135 2018d), only the 2020 target is within reach. Substantial efforts will therefore be needed to
136 reach the 2030 target and, even more substantial, to reach the 2050 objective (EEA, 2018j).


137 The EU is the sum of its Member States and almost all of them have reduced emissions since
138 1990. Almost 50% of the EU net-decrease was accounted for by Germany and the UK (Table 7.3).
139 The overall mitigation efforts by most Member States were partly offset by higher GHG
140 emissions in a few MS, notably in Spain.



141 On an aggregate level, Figure 7.2 shows that GHG emissions decreased in the majority of sectors
 142 between 1990 and 2016, with the notable exception of domestic and international transport.
 143 The largest decrease in emissions in absolute terms occurred in energy supply and industry,
 144 although agriculture, residential and commercial (i.e. buildings), and waste management have
 145 all contributed to the positive trend in GHG emissions since 1990. The figure also shows the
 146 strong increase in CO₂ emissions from biomass combustion. Although net removals from LULUCF
 147 increased over the period, the strong increase in CO₂ emissions from biomass combustion
 148 highlights the rapidly increasing importance of bioenergy in replacing fossil fuel sources in the
 149 EU. The pressures from these sectors are not only relevant to climate change but also to other
 150 environmental variables [editorial note: add cross-reference to chapter 13].

151 On a more detailed level, Table 7.2 shows that the largest emission reductions took place in
 152 manufacturing industries and construction, electricity and heat production, and residential
 153 combustion. The largest decrease in emissions in relative terms occurred in waste management,
 154 through reduced and better controlled landfilling. Emissions from HFCs and road transportation
 155 increased substantially over the 1990-2016 period.

156 **Figure 7.2 GHG emissions by main sector in the EU-28, 1990-2015**



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158 Note: The sectoral aggregations are:

159 Energy supply: CRF 1A1 (energy industries) + 1B (fugitives); Industry: CRF 1A2 (manufacturing industries
 160 and construction) + CRF 2 (industrial processes); Transport: CRF 1.A.3; Residential and commercial: CRF
 161 1A4a (commercial) + CRF 1A4b (residential); Agriculture: CRF 1A4c (agriculture, forestry and fishing) +
 162 CRF 3 (agriculture); Waste: CRF 5 (waste); LULUCF: CRF 4 (LULUCF).

163 International aviation, international shipping and CO₂ biomass are Memorandum items not included in
 164 national GHG totals.

165 Source: EEA

166 This represents a challenge for Member States and the achievement of the 2030 targets under
 167 the EU Effort Sharing Regulation since transport accounts for about one third of emissions
 168 covered by the sectors where national mitigation targets apply.



169 **Table 7.2 Overview of EU-28 plus Iceland source categories whose emissions increased**
 170 **or decreased by more than 20 million tonnes CO₂ equivalent in the period 1990–2016**

Source category	Million tonnes (CO ₂ equivalents)
Road Transportation (CO ₂ from 1.A.3.b)	163
Refrigeration and Air conditioning (HFCs from 2.F.1)	97
Aluminium Production (PFCs from 2.C.3)	-21
Agricultural Soils: Direct N ₂ O Emissions From Managed Soils (N ₂ O from 3.D.1)	-26
Fugitive emisisions from Natural Gas (CH ₄ from 1.B.2.b)	-26
Cement Production (CO ₂ from 2.A.1)	-28
Fluorochemical Production (HFCs from 2.B.9)	-29
Commercial/Institutional (CO ₂ from 1.A.4.a)	-40
Enteric Fermentation: Cattle (CH ₄ from 3.A.1)	-44
Nitric Acid Production (N ₂ O from 2.B.2)	-46
Adipic Acid Production (N ₂ O from 2.B.3)	-57
Manufacture of Solid Fuels and Other Energy Industries (CO ₂ from 1.A.1.c)	-61
Coal Mining and Handling (CH ₄ from 1.B.1.a)	-69
Managed Waste Disposal Sites (CH ₄ from 5.A.1)	-73
Residential: Fuels (CO ₂ from 1.A.4.b)	-109
Iron and steel production (CO ₂ from 1.A.2.a +2.C.1)	-120
Manufacturing industries (excl. Iron and steel) (Energy-related CO ₂ from 1.A.2 excl. 1.A.2.a)	-278
Public Electricity and Heat Production (CO ₂ from 1.A.1.a)	-420
Total	-1356

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Source: EEA

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Currently, the EU's climate mitigation policy is based on a distinction between GHG emissions from large industrial sources, which are currently governed by the EU emissions trading system (EU ETS) (EC, 2019b) and emissions from sectors covered by the Effort Sharing Decision (ESD) (EC, 2019a). For ETS, there is an overall cap for the period 2013-2020, which puts a limit to emissions from installations by setting the maximum amount of allowed emissions during the 8-year period. For the ESD sectors, there are binding annual greenhouse gas emission targets for Member States for the period 2013–2020.

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Between 2005 and 2016, emissions covered under the EU ETS have decreased more rapidly than those from sectors not covered by the System. ETS emissions did increase faster than non-ETS emissions during the first phase of the EU ETS between 2005 and 2007, coinciding with a period of larger consumption of hard coal and lignite for power generation. Since then, however, ETS emissions have decreased by a faster rate than non-ETS. To the improvements observed in the carbon intensity and energy efficiency in the heat and power sector, the economic recession that started in the second half of 2008 affected ETS sectors more than those outside the ETS (EEA, 2014b). The largest industrial installations are part of the EU ETS and the contraction in gross value added in industry appears to have led to a significant reduction in final energy demand and emissions in the sector. When emissions from energy supply are allocated to the end-user sectors, EEA figures show that the largest emission reductions in the period following the economic recession were by and large accounted for by industry as a whole (EEA, 2012).

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Of the net EU reduction in total GHG emissions between 2005 and 2016, two thirds was accounted for the ETS, and one third by the sectors not covered under the ETS. The sectors falling under the scope of the Effort Sharing Decision (soon Effort Sharing Regulation) currently represent about 60 % of total greenhouse gas emissions in the EU, and broadly include



196 residential and commercial (buildings), transport, waste, agriculture and the part of industry not
197 covered by the ETS. Of these sectors, improvements since 2005 have been more visible for
198 bulidings, non-ETS industry and waste management. Emission reductions in agriculture and
199 transport have been modest since 2005; and, for transport, emissions have actually increased
200 consecutively in the last few years, both for freight and passenger cars.

201 *Analysis of key past and future trends and drivers*

202 The speed of reduction in GHG emissions observed in the past will not be sufficient to meet the
203 2030 targets unless there are further improvements in both energy efficiency and carbon
204 intensity (EEA, 2017a).

205 Figure 7.3 shows a comparison of key drivers underpinning GHG emissions in three different
206 periods (1990-2005, 2005-2015 and 2015-2030), based on information reported by EU Member
207 States.

208 Overall, the four main findings at EU level are:


- 209 1. Higher GDP would usually lead to higher GHG emissions, other factors equal, because
210 economic growth is intrinsically linked to an energy system that remains heavily
211 dependent of fossil fuels in most European countries (EEA, 2014b). Yet, the figure shows
212 that emissions decreased and are expected to decrease further as GDP increases,
213 confirming that that attempts to mitigate climate change do not necessarily conflict with
214 a growing economy. In addition, GHG intensities of Member States have both decreased
215 since 1990 and converge. One reason for this convergence is the strong growth in the
216 use of renewable energy sources in most Member States and a clear move towards less
217 carbon intensive fuels. Due to this strong convergence, GHG emissions per capita and
218 per GDP are more similar now across Member States than they were in 1990. Projections
219 by Member States suggest a continued decoupling of GHG emissions alongside higher
220 economic growth for the period 2015-2030. However, higher levels of renewables in the
221 energy mix will be required to achieve complete decoupling between GHG emissions,
222 energy and economic growth.
- 223 2. The lower carbon intensity of energy has been a key factor underpinning lower
224 emissions, in spite of a decline in nuclear electricity production in the last years. This
225 positive trends has been due both to the higher contribution from renewable energy
226 sources in the fuel mix and to the switch from the more carbon-intensive coal to the less
227 carbon intensive gas. The lower carbon intensity of energy (i.e. fewer emissions to
228 produce and use energy) was, and is expected to remain an important factor
229 underpinning lower emissions in the future. According to Member States' projections,
230 both an increase in renewable energy sources and a less carbon intensive fossil fuel mix,
231 with more gas, less coal and a lower consumption of oil, are expected to drive emission
232 reductions in the future.
- 233 3. The decrease in primary energy intensity was the largest contributing factor to lower
234 CO₂ emissions from fossil fuel combustion in the past. The lower energy intensity of GDP
235 can be explained by improvements in energy efficiency (transformation and end-use)
236 and the strong uptake of renewables, as well as by changes in the structure of the
237 economy and a higher share of the services sector compared to the more energy
238 intensive industrial sector¹. The decrease in the primary energy intensity of energy, is

¹ There are various reasons for the lower share of industry in Europe. Industry can close down, become more efficient and even relocate. Carbon footprint statistics (consumption-based approach) can be useful for assessing the impact of domestic economic activities abroad and for the analysis of emission trends. Yet, the assessment of progress



239 expected to remain a key factor in the transition to a low carbon economy. This means
 240 continued improvements in energy efficiency, both in transformation and end-use.
 241 4. The largest emission reductions occurred in the energy combustion sector. Although the
 242 effects shown in the decomposition analysis have been modest (as energy-related
 243 emissions have decreased faster than non-energy emissions), the actual emission
 244 reductions observed in industrial processes, agriculture and waste management have
 245 been substantial since 1990. The largest emission reductions will continue to occur in
 246 the energy sector, although all sectors of the economy are expected to contribute to
 247 meeting climate mitigation objectives.

248 **Figure 7.3 Drivers of GHG emission reductions in the EU-28, 1990-2016**



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250 Note: The decomposition analysis is based on the logarithmic mean Divisia index (LMDI). The bar segments show the
 251 changes associated with each factor alone, holding the other respective factors constant. Projections at EU level have
 252 been aggregated based on Member States' submissions under EU reporting requirements. GHG emission projections
 253 in this figure refer to those in the 'with existing measures' scenario. The EU Reference Scenario 2016 from the
 254 European Commission (based on the PRIMES and GAINS models) was used to gap-fill incomplete reporting for specific
 255 Member States' variables.

256 Source: EEA

257 Overall, the same factors driving emission reductions in the past are also expected to play a key
 258 role in the future, although to a different degree. For the EU as whole, the provisional overall
 259 estimates for GHG emission reductions by 2030 (with existing policies and measures), as
 260 reported by Member States, are consistent with a 30 % reduction compared with 1990
 261 (excluding LULUCF, including international aviation). Whereas the EU is on track to achieve its
 262 20 % GHG reduction target by 2020, more efforts to reduce GHG emissions will be needed to

towards GHG mitigation targets used here is consistent with how the targets have been defined (production-based approach). Also, while Europe may be indirectly generating some of the emissions elsewhere for final consumption in Europe — exported EU emissions — a share of Europe's own emissions can also be traced to final consumption of European goods outside Europe — imported EU emissions.



263 achieve its reduction target of at least 40 % by 2030 (EEA, 2018j). These results suggest that
264 efforts should, together with lower energy intensity and higher efficiency, concentrate on
265 further improving the carbon intensity of energy production and consumption. In this regard,
266 transport emissions would have to decrease substantially for the EU and MS to meet their
267 targets.

268 It is worth highlighting that warmer winters is another factor of lower GHG emissions in Europe.
269 There has been lower fuel use due to the lower demand for space heating due to better
270 insulation standards and retrofitting in buildings. Also, and notwithstanding the different trends
271 by country and region, Europe has been experiencing milder winters since 1990. There is also a
272 clear positive correlation between heating degree days (HDDs) and fuel use and emissions from
273 the residential sector. According to Eurostat data (Eurostat, 2019), the current demand for
274 heating in Europe is below its long-term average (defined as 1980-2004). An EEA analysis on
275 heating and cooling (EEA, 2016b), showed that HDDs have decreased by about 0.5 % per year
276 between 1981 and 2014, and particularly in northern and north-western Europe. In parallel,
277 cooling degree days (CDDs) increased on average by almost 2 % per year during the same period,
278 particularly in southern Europe. Because temperatures in Europe are projected to increase, the
279 trends of lower HDDs and higher CDDs are also expected to continue, if not accelerate.

280 In sum, the EU has so far managed to reduce its GHG emissions since 1990 due to a combination
281 of factors, including:

- 282 ▪ the effects of a number of policies (both EU and country-specific), including key
283 agricultural and environmental policies in the 1990s, and climate and energy policies in
284 the 2000s. These include, among others:
- 285 ▪ the growing use of energy from renewable sources;
- 286 ▪ the use of less carbon-intensive fossil fuels (e.g. switch from coal to gas);
- 287 ▪ improvements in energy efficiency;
- 288 ▪ structural changes in the economy, with a higher share of services and a lower share of
289 more energy-intensive industry in total GDP;
- 290 ▪ the effects of economic recession;
- 291 ▪ the milder winters experienced in Europe on average since 1990, which has reduced the
292 demand for energy to heat households.

293 Finally, in spite of good progress in reducing GHG emissions intensity and decarbonising the EU
294 economy, fossil fuels are still the largest source of energy and emissions in the EU. There cannot
295 be a complete decoupling of emissions from economic growth in a fossil-fuel economy. This is
296 because energy demand, which is mostly fossil-fuel driven, remains connected to economic
297 growth. This also implies that the higher the contribution from renewables the easier it will be
298 to break the link between economic growth, energy demand and GHG emissions.



299 [Editorial note: The table below will be updated with 2017 GHG inventory data and the
300 projections reported in 2019.]

301 **Table 7.3 Country comparison – Climate mitigation variables and indicators by country:**
302 **trends and projections**

	Change in total GHG emissions excluding LULUCF 1990-2016 (%)	GHG emissions per GDP in 2016 (PPS, EU-28=100)	GHG emissions per capita in 2016, (tCO ₂ eq. per person)	Change in the carbon intensity of energy 1990-2016	Change in the total energy intensity of the economy 1990-2016	Projected change in total GHG emissions 2015-2030 (%)
Austria	3.1	84	9.4	-22.1	-16.2	-11.1
Belgium	-18.5	106	10.8	-28.6	-24.3	-2.9
Bulgaria	-43.0	199	8.4	-11.6	-58.2	-6.1
Croatia	-23.8	114	5.9	-13.2	-19.5	3.5
Cyprus	52.9	156	11.3	3.8	-24.7	-7.0
Czech Republic	-34.4	164	12.4	-25.1	-48.3	-12.7
Denmark	-26.1	85	9.3	-25.8	-35.8	5.5
Estonia	-51.4	224	15.0	-24.5	-59.9	-5.4
Finland	-16.0	117	11.1	-29.7	-20.6	-12.0
France	-14.4	79	7.1	-20.0	-25.8	-12.0
Germany	-25.9	106	11.4	-14.5	-39.5	-16.8
Greece	-10.3	148	8.8	-18.5	-12.6	-9.7
Hungary	-34.2	108	6.3	-26.1	-37.5	-3.1
Ireland	13.4	87	13.5	-12.9	-63.8	11.0
Italy	-16.2	86	7.2	-17.5	-15.3	-9.5
Latvia	-56.2	106	6.0	-29.8	-54.1	7.4
Lithuania	-58.0	108	7.1	-21.3	-67.8	10.1
Luxembourg	-12.5	88	19.8	-21.2	-52.3	-4.3
Malta	-0.6	61	5.0	-32.4	-54.3	-11.3
Netherlands	-8.4	109	12.2	-7.1	-31.7	-12.8
Poland	-15.0	175	10.5	-11.2	-61.7	-8.8
Portugal	15.8	102	6.9	-7.9	-9.1	-20.0
Romania	-54.2	114	5.8	-22.3	-65.3	8.3
Slovakia	-44.4	114	7.6	-35.7	-64.8	-0.8
Slovenia	-4.8	121	8.6	-18.2	-27.3	-2.3
Spain	16.4	92	7.3	-12.3	-19.1	-0.6
Sweden	-23.9	53	5.6	-28.5	-40.5	-13.5
United Kingdom	-36.4	84	7.9	-25.0	-46.4	-18.1
EU-28	-22.4	100	8.7	-19.5	-35.9	-10.5
Iceland	45.1	147	16.7	-43.0	12.7	-
Norway	4.6	81	10.5	1.0	-29.8	-
Liechtenstein	-17.7	-	5.0	-	-	-
Switzerland	-5.6	46	6.4	-	-	-
Turkey	139.9	116	6.4	0.5	-11.1	-

303

304 Notes: GHG aggregates include international aviation and exclude the LULUCF sector. For the West-Balkan countries,
305 there is no requirement to report GHG inventories annually using the CRF Reporter as Annex I Parties to UNFCCC do.
306 However, climate-change information, including GHG inventories and mitigation actions, is available from their
307 [Biennial Update Reports](#) to UNFCCC and from European Commission projects such as the [ECRAN](#).

308 Source: EEA

309

310

311 *Summary assessment*312 **Table 7.4 Summary assessment related to greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation**
313 **efforts**

314

Greenhouse gas emissions and mitigation efforts		
Past trends (10-15 years)		The EU has reduced its GHG emissions by 22% since 1990 primarily as a result of improved energy efficiency, higher shares of renewable energy and a less carbon intensive fossil-fuel mix. Other key factors such as structural changes in the economy towards the services sector, the effects of the economic recession, and a lower heat demand from milder winter conditions also played a role.
Outlooks 2030		The projected reductions in GHG emissions by 2030 (with existing policies and measures), as reported by Member States, are consistent with a 30 % reduction compared with 1990 (excluding LULUCF, and including international aviation) but insufficient to meet the 2030 decarbonisation target.
Prospects to meet policy objectives/targets	2020 ✓	The EU remains on track to achieve its 20% 2020 target compared to 1990. Further mitigation efforts are required to meet the 40 % reduction target by 2030 compared to 1990.
	2030 ✗	Even faster rates of emission reductions are required to meet the 2050 objective of reduction GHG emissions of 80% to 95%.
	2050 ✗	
Robustness		GHG historic data are based on GHG inventories reported to the UNFCCC, and to the EU under the EU Monitoring Mechanism. Although there is uncertainty in emission estimates, GHG inventories undergo a thorough QA/QC and review process on an annual basis. Outlooks are based on GHG projections data from Member States as reported under the EU MMR. The uncertainty in the projections is higher but the estimates for 2020 and 2030 at EU level are fully consistent with what Member States report to the EU.

315

316 **7.4.2 Link between climate change mitigation, adaptation and other policy areas**

317 The success of global efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions determines the magnitude and
318 pace of climate change, and consequently the need for adaptation to its impacts in the long
319 term. Ambitious global mitigation efforts are necessary to avoid the most dangerous impacts of
320 climate change, because there are many limits and barriers to adaptation. At the same time,
321 climate change is already occurring, and it will continue for many decades – and in the case of
322 sea level rise: many centuries – to come, even under the most stringent mitigation policies.
323 Therefore, societies need to adapt to the unavoidable impacts of past and future climate change.
324 In summary, the short-term adaptation challenges are largely independent of mitigation efforts,
325 whereas the long-term climate challenge, and societies' ability to adapt to it, are strongly
326 dependent on the success of global mitigation efforts.

327 Climate change mitigation and adaptation objectives can be mutually reinforcing, but also in
328 conflict with each other. One strategy that often brings about mitigation as well as adaptation
329 benefits is ecosystem-based adaptation (EbA), which uses ecosystem services as a part of an
330 overall strategy to increase the resilience and reduce the vulnerability of communities to climate
331 change (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2009). This strategy overlaps with



332 concepts like nature-based solutions and includes natural water retention measures ⁽²⁾ and
333 green infrastructure (EC, 2013b). When designed, implemented and monitored appropriately,
334 EbA often has a higher benefit-cost ratio than traditional infrastructure works due to the
335 multiple environmental, social, economic and cultural co-benefits it generates, especially when
336 non-monetary aspects are included as well. EbA can also contribute to climate change mitigation
337 by reducing emissions caused by ecosystem degradation and/or by enhancing carbon stocks.

338 *[Editorial note: A number of co-benefits from climate change mitigation will be discussed in an*
339 *upcoming EEA report (expected in Q2 of 2019) on the key trends and drivers underpinning the*
340 *GHG inventory submission to UNFCCC]*

341 **7.4.3 Climate change and its impacts on ecosystems**

342 *[Editorial note: This section will be updated with information from the Copernicus Climate*
343 *Change Service (C3S) State of the Climate Report 2018, to be published in spring 2019.]*

344 All ecosystems, many economic activities as well as human health and well-being are sensitive
345 to climate variability and change. This section gives an overview of key changes in the climate
346 system in the past and the futures, and of selected impacts on ecosystems. More detailed
347 information on this topic is available in a recent EEA report (EEA, 2017b).

348 **Average temperature**

349 *[Editorial note: To be updated based on [latest assessment of CSI 012](#) (planned for early 2019)]*


350 Global average annual near-surface (land and ocean) temperature in the last decade (2008–
351 2017) was about 0.9 °C warmer than the pre-industrial average (1850–1899) (Figure 7.4); the
352 European land area has warmed by 1.6-1.7 °C over the same period. Of the 17 warmest years
353 on the record globally, 16 have occurred since 2000 ([EEA indicator 'Global and European](#)
354 [temperature' \(CSI 012\)](#)).

355 All UNFCCC member countries have agreed on the long-term goal of keeping the increase in
356 global average temperature to well below 2 °C compared with pre-industrial levels and have
357 agreed to aim to limit the increase to 1.5 °C. About half of the maximum admissible warming
358 under the Paris Agreement has already been realized. For the three highest of the four
359 representative concentration pathways (emissions scenarios) considered by the IPCC, the global
360 mean temperature increase is projected to exceed 2 °C compared with pre-industrial levels
361 during the 21st century, and most likely in the 2040s (IPCC, 2013; Vautard et al., 2014). Very rapid
362 global emissions reductions are necessary to keep the chance of limiting global mean
363 temperature increase to 1.5 °C (IPCC, 2018).

(²) <http://nwrn.eu>



364 **Figure 7.4** Global average near surface temperature since the pre-industrial period



365

366 **Source:** [EEA indicator 'Global and European temperature' \(CSI 012\)](#)

367 *Heat extremes*

368 *[Editorial note: To be updated based on [latest assessment of CSI 012](#) (planned for early 2019)]*


369 Annually averaged land temperatures in Europe have increased considerably faster than global
 370 temperatures (see above), and daily maximum temperatures in Europe have increased much
 371 faster than annually averaged temperatures. This means that a given increase in global mean
 372 temperature is associated with a much larger increase in heat extremes.

373 Heat extremes and heat waves in Europe have increased considerably since the 1950s, with
 374 notable impacts on ecosystems, economic activities and human health. 500-year-old
 375 temperature records were broken over 65 % of Europe in the period 2003–2010 alone.
 376 Afterwards, the years 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2018 broke further temperature records in Europe.
 377 Human-induced climate change made those unprecedented recent heat waves in Europe much
 378 more likely than they would have been otherwise ([EEA indicator 'Global and European
 379 temperature' \(CSI 012\)](#)).

380 Heat waves are projected to become even more frequent and longer lasting in Europe. Under a
 381 high emissions scenario, very extreme heat waves (much stronger than the 2003 heat wave
 382 affecting southern and central Europe or the 2010 heat wave affecting eastern Europe) are
 383 projected to occur as often as every two years in the second half of the 21st century (Figure 7.5).
 384 The projected frequency of heat waves is greatest in southern and south-eastern Europe (Russo
 385 et al., 2014).

386 The most severe economic and health risks from heat waves are projected for low-altitude river
 387 basins in southern Europe and for the Mediterranean coasts, where many densely populated
 388 urban centres are located. The effects of heat waves are exacerbated in cities due to the urban
 389 heat island effect.

390 Figure 7.5 Extreme heat waves in the future under two different forcing scenarios



391

392 **Note:** RCP4.5 corresponds to a medium emissions scenario whereas RCP8.5 refers to a high emissions scenario.
 393 Neither of these scenarios is compatible with the stabilization target of the Paris Agreement.

394 **Source:** [EEA indicator 'Global and European temperature' \(CSI 012\)](#), adapted from (Russo et al., 2014).


395 **Total precipitation**

396 **Source:** [Latest assessment of CLIM002](#) (from early 2017)

397 Observed and projected changes in precipitation vary substantially across regions and seasons.
 398 Annual precipitation has increased in most parts of northern Europe and decreased in parts of
 399 southern Europe. These changes are projected to exacerbate in the future with continued
 400 climate change, the projected decrease in southern Europe is strongest in the summer (Figure
 401 7.6) ([EEA indicator 'Mean precipitation' \(CLIM 002\)](#)).



402 **Figure 7.6** Projected changes in annual and summer precipitation



403

404 **Note:** Projected changes in annual (left) and summer (right) precipitation (%) in the period 2071-2100 compared to
 405 the baseline period 1971-2000 for the forcing scenario RCP 8.5. Model simulations are based on the multi-model
 406 ensemble average of RCM simulations from the EURO-CORDEX initiative.

407 **Source:** [EEA indicator 'Mean precipitation' \(CLIM 002\)](#), based on EURO-CORDEX data.

408 *Heavy precipitation and inland floods*

409 *[Editorial note: To be updated based on [Latest assessment of CLIM004](#) (planned for early 2019)]*

410 The intensity of heavy precipitation events, which can cause floods, has increased in summer
 411 and winter in most parts of northern Europe. The largest increase has been observed for
 412 particularly strong precipitation events. Different indices show diverging trends for southern
 413 Europe. Heavy precipitation events are likely to become more frequent in most parts of Europe
 414 ([EEA indicator 'Heavy precipitation' \(CLIM 004\)](#)).


415 The number of very severe flood events in Europe has increased in recent decades, but with
 416 large inter-annual variability. Various European-wide studies project river floods to become
 417 more frequent in north-western and central-western parts of Europe; available studies come to
 418 divergent results in other regions (Kundzewicz et al., 2016, 2018). Pluvial floods and flash floods,
 419 which are triggered by intense local precipitation events, are likely to become more frequent
 420 throughout Europe ([EEA indicator 'River floods' \(CLIM 017\)](#)).

421 *Droughts*

422 Drought conditions have generally increased in southern Europe and decreased in northern
 423 Europe, with some differences between various drought indicators. The increased droughts in
 424 southern Europe are driven by reductions in precipitation as well as by rising temperatures,
 425 which increases evapotranspiration. This pattern is projected to continue in the future (Figure
 426 7.7). The observed and projected increase in drought conditions in southern Europe is increasing
 427 competition between different water users, such as agriculture, industry, tourism and
 428 households ([EEA indicator 'Meteorological and hydrological droughts' \(CLIM018\)](#)). For further
 429 information on freshwater systems affected by climate change, see Chapter 4.



430 **Figure 7.7** Projected changes in the frequency of meteorological droughts



431
 432 **Note:** The maps show projected changes in the number of months with drought conditions by mid-century (2041-
 433 2070 relative to 1981-2010) for two different emissions scenario: RCP4.5 (left) and RCP8.5 (right). For an explanation
 434 of these scenarios, see **Figure 7.5**.

435 **Source:** JRC (Spinoni et al., 2018).

436 *Global and European sea level*


437 *[Editorial note: To be updated based on [Latest assessment of CSI047](#) (planned for January 2019)]*

438 Global mean sea level has increased by about 20 cm since 1900; the rise in global sea level has
 439 accelerated in recent decades as a result of human-induced climate change. The model
 440 simulations used in the IPCC AR5 projected a rise in global sea level over the 21st century that is
 441 likely in the range of 28–98 cm (depending on the emissions scenario), but substantially higher
 442 values of sea level rise were not ruled out. Several recent model-based studies, expert
 443 assessments and national assessments have suggested an upper bound for 21st century global
 444 mean sea level rise in the range of 1.5–2.5 m. Further increases by several metres are projected
 445 for the following centuries if the stabilization goal of the Paris Agreement is not met ([EEA](#)
 446 [indicator 'Global and European sea level' \(CSI 047\)](#)).

447 All coastal regions in Europe have experienced an increase in absolute sea level, but with
 448 significant regional variation (Figure 7.8). Extreme high coastal water levels have increased at
 449 most locations along the European coastline. The rise in sea level relative to land along most
 450 European coasts is projected to be similar to the global average, with the exception of the
 451 northern Baltic Sea and the northern Atlantic coast, which are experiencing considerable land
 452 rise as a consequence of post-glacial rebound. The increase in sea level and coastal flood levels
 453 is threatening coastal ecosystems, water resources, settlements, infrastructure and human lives
 454 (see also Chapter 6). All available studies project that the economic damages from coastal floods
 455 in Europe would increase many-fold in the absence of adaptation.



456 **Figure 7.8** Trend in absolute mean sea level across Europe



457

458 **Note:** Observed altimeter sea level trends (mm/year) during January 1993 to May 2017. The data has not been
459 adjusted for glacial isostatic adjustment.

460 **Source:** C3S Sea level indicator (C3S, 2018)

461 *Further changes in the climate system*

462 Climate change is also evident through melting glaciers, decreasing sea ice and warming oceans.
463 Furthermore, the CO₂ emissions driving global climate change are turning the oceans more acidic
464 (sour), which inhibits the growth of calcifying organisms (see also Chapter 6).

465 *Climate change impacts on forests and other ecosystems*

466 Climate change has caused widespread changes in the distribution of plant and animal species
467 in Europe, both on land and in the sea. The migration has generally been northward and, for
468 land-based species, upwards to higher altitudes. The migration of many land-based species is
469 lagging behind the changes in climate, which may lead to a progressive decline in European
470 biodiversity ([EEA indicator 'Distribution shifts of plant and animal species' \(CLIM 022\)](#); [EEA](#)
471 [indicator 'Distribution shifts of marine species' \(CLIM 015\)](#)). Climate change is also leading to
472 changes in the seasonality of biological events, such as flowering of plants or hatching of birds.
473 Because these changes are not uniform across species, some animals no longer find sufficient
474 food when they need it. Overall, these changes make it more difficult to achieve policy objectives
475 related to preserving terrestrial and marine biodiversity in Europe (see also Chapters 3 and 6).

476 Forest growth is generally projected to increase in northern Europe and to decrease in southern
477 Europe, but with substantial regional variation. At the same time, forest tree species are shifting
478 towards higher altitudes and latitudes as a result of climate change ([EEA indicator 'Forest](#)
479 [composition and distribution' \(CLIM 034\)](#)). More severe fire weather and, as a consequence, an
480 expansion of the fire-prone area and longer fire seasons are projected across Europe in a warmer
481 climate ([EEA indicator 'Forest fires' \(CLIM 035\)](#)). The impact of fire events is particularly strong
482 in southern Europe, as exemplified by the extreme fires in Portugal in 2017 and in Spain and
483 Greece in 2018. However, northern Europe can also be affected. For example, Sweden
484 experienced unprecedented forest fires during extreme heat waves combined with droughts in
485 2014 and again in 2018. Climate change is also affecting the regional and spatial occurrence of
486 forest pests and diseases. Forest insect pests are projected to increase in most regions of Europe
487 (EEA, 2017b, section 4.4.7). These combined impacts considerably affect forest structure, the
488 functioning of forest ecosystems and their services (see also Chapter 5).



489 *Summary assessment*

490 **Table 7.5** Summary assessment for sub-theme 'climate change and its impacts on
491 ecosystems'

492

Climate change and its impacts on ecosystems		
Past trends (10-15 years)		Anthropogenic climate change is ongoing and has led to increasing impacts on ecosystems. In some cases, such as sea level rise, changes have been accelerating.
Outlooks 2030		Climate change will continue in the coming decades, with increasingly severe impacts on species and ecosystems projected.
Prospects to meet policy objectives/targets	2020 	While there are no specific targets related to climate change and its impacts on ecosystems in Europe, the 7 th EAP requires the mainstreaming of climate change adaptation into key policy initiatives and sectors in order to protect, conserve and enhance natural capital. Continuing climate change makes it more difficult to achieve other policy targets related to biodiversity protection, ecosystems and water quality.
Robustness		The qualitative and aggregated assessment presented here is based on a multitude of direct observations and quantitative modelling. It is considered robust, even though considerable uncertainties exist for climate change and its impacts on specific ecosystems at the regional level.

493 **7.4.4 Climate change risks to society**

494 Climate change is affecting human health and well-being as well as most economic activities.
495 This section gives an overview of selected climate change impacts on society. More detailed
496 information on this topic is available in a recent EEA report (EEA, 2017b).

497 *Health impacts of climate change*

498 Heat waves are the most deadly climate extremes in Europe; they have caused tens of thousands
499 of premature deaths in Europe since 2000. The projected substantial increase in the frequency
500 and magnitude of heat waves will lead to a large increase in mortality over the next decades,
501 especially in vulnerable population groups (the elderly, children, those in poor health), unless
502 adaptation measures are taken. Urban areas are particularly affected due to the combination of
503 higher temperatures as a result of the urban heat island effect, frequent combination of heat
504 with air pollution, and high population density ([EEA indicator 'Extreme temperatures and health' \(CLIM 036\)](#)).
505

506 Climate change is also affecting human health and well-being directly through floods and
507 indirectly by changing the magnitude, frequency, seasonality and/or regional distribution of
508 vector-borne, water-borne and food-borne diseases, pollen allergens and air pollution incidents.
509 For example, extremely warm water temperatures in the Baltic Sea and the North Sea during
510 recent heat waves were associated with unprecedented peaks in *Vibrio* infections in humans
511 (EEA, 2017b, section 5.2).

512 *Economic losses from climate-related extremes*


513 *[Editorial note: This text will be updated based on the [Latest assessment of CSI042](#) (planned for
514 early 2019)]*

515 The direct economic losses caused by weather and climate-related extremes in the EEA member
516 countries amounted to approximately EUR 436 billion (in 2016 Euro values) over the period



1980-2016 (Figure 7.9). Most of the losses were caused by a small number of very strong events, which makes the detection of trends difficult ([EEA indicator 'Economic losses from climate-related extremes' \(CSI 042\)](#)). Model simulations performed by the JRC project large increases in most climate hazards in Europe, with considerable economic damages. For example, impacts on critical infrastructure could rise ten-fold during the 21st century due to climate change along in the absence of effective adaptation (Forzieri et al., 2016, 2018).

523 **Figure 7.9 Economic damage caused by climate-related extreme events**



524

525 Source: [EEA indicator 'Economic losses from climate-related extremes' \(CSI 042\)](#)

526 *Other economic impacts of climate change*

527 A changing climate is affecting a wide range of economic sectors and human activities, including
 528 agriculture, forestry, fisheries, water management, coastal and flood protection energy,
 529 transport, tourism, construction and human health. Various research projects have assessed the
 530 multi-sectoral social and economic impacts of climate change across Europe or for specific
 531 European regions. The specific estimates depend strongly on the underlying climate scenarios;
 532 the sectors considered, including cross-border impacts; the assumptions regarding demographic
 533 and socio-economic developments, including adaptation; the treatment of uncertainties; and
 534 the economic valuation of non-market impacts and of future versus current impacts (EEA,
 535 2017b, section 6.3).

536 The PESETA III study by the JRC estimates the net welfare loss from climate change in the EU at
 537 1.9 % of GDP under a high warming scenario (RCP8.5) and 0.7 % under a 2 °C scenario (see Figure
 538 7.10). Southern and central-southern Europe are projected to suffer by far the highest costs as
 539 a percentage of GDP. Welfare losses in southern and central Europe are dominated by health-
 540 related impacts, in particular increased mortality from heat waves, but also reduced labour
 541 productivity. In contrast, welfare losses in northern and north-western Europe are dominated
 542 by coastal floods. The only sector with (small) positive welfare impacts is the energy sector, due
 543 to reduced heating needs in a warming climate (Ciscar et al., 2018).


544 The PESETA III estimates are based on a limited number of sectors and climate change impacts.
 545 Other studies using different modelling frameworks and assumptions have arrived at both
 546 higher and lower estimates. Many impacts can be significantly reduced by appropriate



547 adaptation measures. However, adaptation generally comes at a cost, there may be trade-offs
 548 with other policy objectives, and residual impacts remain (EEA, 2017b, section 6.3; EC, 2018b,
 549 Annex XIII).

550 European societies are also affected by the impacts of climate change occurring outside Europe,
 551 which can affect Europe through different pathways, such as international trade and migration
 552 (EEA, 2017b, section 6.4; Ciscar et al., 2018).

553 **Figure 7.10 Projected welfare impacts of climate change for different EU regions and**
 554 **sectors for two warming scenarios**



555

556 Note: The country grouping is as follows: Northern Europe: Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Denmark.
 557 UK & Ireland: United Kingdom and Ireland. Central Europe North: Belgium, Netherlands, Germany and Poland. Central
 558 Europe South: France, Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania. Southern Europe: Portugal,
 559 Spain, Italy, Greece and Bulgaria.

560 Source: JRC (Ciscar et al., 2018)


561 *Europe's vulnerability to climate change impacts occurring outside Europe*

562 European societies are also affected by the impacts of climate change outside Europe, which can
 563 affect Europe through different pathways, such as international trade and migration, as
 564 illustrated in Figure 7.11. These “cross-border effects” may significantly influence the overall
 565 risk of climate change to regions, sectors and people. Cross-border effects of climate change
 566 may be caused by a single extreme weather event (for examples, a temporary disruption of
 567 global supply chains due to damaged production or transport infrastructure following a flood),
 568 by prolonged periods of extreme weather (for example, an extreme drought that increases
 569 world market prices of agricultural droughts) or by gradual climate change (for example, flooding
 570 of densely populated coastal areas that triggers internal and international migration) (EEA,
 571 2017b, section 6.4).

572 The strongest evidence for Europe's sensitivity to cross-border impacts are the economic effects
 573 caused by climate-induced global price volatilities; disruptions to transportation networks such
 574 as ports; and changes in the Arctic environment.

575 According to several studies, European vulnerability to cross-border effects of climate change is
 576 expected to increase in the coming decades, but quantitative projections are not yet available.

577 **Figure 7.11** Overview of major pathways of indirect climate change impacts for Europe



578

579 *Summary assessment*

580 **Table 7.6** Summary assessment for sub-theme ‘climate change risks to society’

581

Climate change risks to society		
Past trends (10-15 years)		Premature deaths due to heatwaves and an increase in the incidence of several vector and water-borne diseases have been observed in Europe. Forest fires facilitated by extreme heat and drought have led to considerable death tolls in recent years. There are no clear trends in the economic losses from extreme weather events.
Outlooks 2030		The past trends related to health impacts are projected to continue with ongoing climate change. The overall economic impacts of climate change on Europe are primarily negative, but with substantial variation across regions and economic activities.
Prospects to meet policy objectives/targets	2020 ■	There are no specific targets for climate-related health risks although the 7 th EAP requires decisive progress is made in adapting to climate change to safeguard from environment related pressures and risks to health. There is some evidence that repeated climatic extremes affecting the same region (e.g. heat waves) lead to lower health impacts due to adaptation.
Robustness		Data on past climate-sensitive health impacts originates from different sources, including mandatory reporting, official statistics and attribution analyses. The identification of trends is difficult because the most significant events are very rare. An overall assessment of the impacts of climate change on health is hampered by the lack of reliable estimates for cold-related health impacts. Data on economic losses from climate-related events is derived from insurance data, including estimates of non-insured losses. Attribution of trends is difficult because of the sparsity of the most costly events as well as concurrent developments in hazard, exposure and vulnerability.



582 **7.5 Responses and prospects for meeting agreed targets and objectives**

583 **7.5.1 Climate change mitigation**

584 A number of policies have played an important role in GHG emission reductions in the past 26
585 years (EEA, 2018g) (EEA, 2018f). In addition to the expected mitigation effects of climate policies,
586 there have been positive indirect effects from other policies that were not aimed at reducing
587 GHG emissions.

588 For instance, key EU policies such as the Nitrates Directive, the market reform of the Common
589 Agriculture Policy (CAP) and the Landfill Directive have had a positive impact on reducing
590 greenhouse gas emissions from methane and nitrous oxides. The Montreal Protocol on ozone-
591 depleting substances (ODS) has been one of the most successful multilateral environmental (and
592 indirectly climatic) agreements to date, contributing to substantial GHG emissions reductions in
593 Europe and worldwide. This was because many of the substances addressed in the Montreal
594 protocol such as chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) are also potent GHGs (Velders et al., 2007). The
595 banning of CFCs, however, led to an increase in the consumption of substitute gases such as
596 HFCs. In 2016, the Montreal Protocol was thus amended in Kigali, where countries committed
597 to cut the production and consumption of HFCs by over 80 % over the next 30 years.

598 Considerable co-benefits exist for air pollution and climate policies (although some trade-offs
599 exist as well, see Chapter 8)

600 . For example, the EU's Large Combustion Plant Directive has encouraged efficiency
601 improvements and fuel switching from solid fuels to cleaner fuels and thus helped reduce
602 emissions, not only of air pollutants but also of greenhouse gases (EEA, 2011). Indeed, the EU
603 has been able to reduce GHG emissions and air pollution, improve energy efficiency and achieve
604 higher shares of renewable energies, and at the same time increase economic growth. Although
605 much remains to be done, policy makers should consider the co-benefits and trade-offs between
606 climate policies and other policies, including environmental policies, in the design of new
607 legislation in order to achieve maximum benefits.

608 In relation to direct effects, and the effectiveness of climate and energy policies, EEA analysis
609 (EEA, 2016a) has shown that there is statistical evidence of a long-run relationship between GHG
610 emissions, economic growth and fossil-energy use, and that GHG emissions can be predicted in
611 the short term based on these two variables, with some variations due to for example
612 particularly cold or warm years. A later analysis (EEA, 2017a) also showed that, based on
613 projections reported by MS, this long-run relationship becomes weaker as the years go by. This
614 would suggest that climate change mitigation policies and measures, as a package if not
615 individually, are gradually working and are expected to have a stronger effect over time both in
616 Member States and at EU level. The analysis concluded that there is a need to further improve
617 energy efficiency and carbon intensity to meet the EU's 2030 and 2050 objectives, and
618 completely decouple GHG emissions from energy use and economic growth.

619 Indeed, although there have been strategies and various policies aimed at reducing GHG in the
620 EU since 2005, the effect of such policies, globally, has been relatively modest. This is because
621 the EU represents 8% of global GHG emissions. The 2020 EU climate and energy framework was
622 partly designed to help the EU achieve its international 20% reduction target by 2020 under the
623 UNFCCC as well as its 20% emission reduction under its Kyoto Protocol. The Paris Agreement
624 signed in 2015 raised the bar for everyone, with all UNFCCC member countries agreeing to keep
625 the increase in global average temperature to well below 2 °C compared with pre-industrial
626 levels and aiming to limit the increase to 1.5 °C (UNFCCC, 2015a). The modalities, procedures
627 and guidelines of the enhanced transparency framework under the Paris Agreement, or Paris
628 rulebook, were decided at COP24 (UNFCCC, 2018).



629 In 2018, the European Council adopted the '2030 climate and energy framework' (EU, 2018a).
630 The headline target of a 40 % reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 is consistent with
631 the EU's National Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement and with the EU's longer-
632 term EU objective of the '2050 low-carbon economy roadmap' of reducing its GHG emissions by
633 80 % by 2050 compared to 1990, with milestones of 40 % by 2030 and 60 % by 2040. The climate-
634 change mitigation objectives are also part of the Energy Union Framework Strategy, which
635 includes the strategic objectives to reduce energy demand, improve energy efficiency and
636 decarbonise the energy mix. Finally, the European Commission proposed in November 2018 an
637 EU strategy for long-term EU greenhouse gas emission reductions, which proposes options for
638 reducing GHG emissions between 80 % and up to net zero emissions by 2050.

639 Although EU domestic legislation is in place in order to meet the Paris Agreement objectives, it
640 is yet unclear whether the current NDCs by all signatories to the Paris Agreement are consistent
641 with the overall UNFCCC objective of avoiding dangerous anthropogenic interference with the
642 climate system (UNFCCC, 1992). The Paris Agreement requires each Party to prepare,
643 communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions (NDCs) that it
644 intends to achieve and to pursue domestic mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the
645 objectives of such contributions. The EU submitted its first NDC in 2015 (UNFCCC, 2015b). New
646 or updated NDCs have to be submitted by all Parties by 2020. The Talanoa Dialogue and the
647 Global Stocktake in 2023 are the mechanisms to ensure that the global community delivers on
648 its objectives to curb emissions to a level consistent with the 2 degree and 1.5 degree targets.

649 The Paris agreement also recognises the role of local and regional actors in climate change
650 mitigation. The Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy brings together local and regional
651 authorities to implement the EU's climate and energy objectives on a voluntary basis (Covenant
652 of Mayors, 2019). In Europe, over 7000 cities have already committed to this goal. Indeed, to
653 address the big challenge and prevent the worst impacts from climate change, mitigation
654 measures can and should occur at any levels of government.

655 The challenge is big. Three out of four representative concentration pathways (the global
656 emissions scenarios used in the latest IPCC report) exceed 2 °C of global warming during the 21st
657 century, and most likely in the 2040s (IPCC, 2013; Vautard et al., 2014). Very rapid global
658 emissions reductions are necessary to keep the chance of limiting global mean temperature
659 increase to 1.5 °C (IPCC, 2018).

660 **7.5.2 Climate change adaptation**

661 A number of multilateral frameworks under the United Nations (UN) with relevance for climate
662 change adaptation have been adopted since 2015. Besides the Paris Agreement on Climate
663 Change (UNFCCC, 2015c), these are the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–
664 2030 (SFDRR, UNISDR, 2015), and the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, including the
665 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs, UN, 2017). All these agreements have strong links to
666 climate change adaptation. The Paris Agreement established the global goal on adaptation
667 (GGA) of “enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to
668 climate change, with a view to contributing to sustainable development and ensuring an
669 adequate adaptation response in the context of the global temperature goal” (UNFCCC, 2015c,
670 Art. 7) and thus, linking adaptation and sustainable development. SFDRR and SDGs also consider
671 adaptation as crucial, therefore possible synergies could arise on the national level where these
672 frameworks need to be implemented. Adaptation monitoring and evaluation is recognised as an
673 important step in the process of adapting to climate change.

674 **Adaptation efforts of the EU**

675 The EU strategy on adaptation to climate change (EC, 2013a) aims to contribute to a more
676 climate-resilient Europe by enhancing the preparedness and capacity to respond to the impacts



677 of climate change from a local to a European level. In November 2018, the EC published an
678 evaluation of the EU Adaptation Strategy (EC, 2018c, 2018b, 2018a). While there is no specific
679 monitoring and evaluation framework for the strategy, the eight different actions defined in the
680 strategy are evaluated in their own right.

681 The evaluation of the EU Adaptation Strategy, based on the REFIT criteria (EC, 2012a), shows
682 progress for each of the actions between 2013 and 2018, and added value to national and sub-
683 national efforts. For example, climate change adaptation is increasingly mainstreamed in EU
684 policies, programmes and strategies; the EU has co-funded many adaptation-related projects
685 across Europe through LIFE and other programmes; most EEA member countries now have a
686 national adaptation strategy; an increasing number of cities are adopting local adaptation
687 strategies; and Climate-ADAPT facilitates the exchange of knowledge relevant for adaptation
688 across Europe. While the adaptation strategy promoted adaptation action plans, it was less
689 effective as regards implementation, monitoring and evaluation of those plans. Reflecting on
690 lessons learned, the evaluation emphasizes the needs for: applying available knowledge for
691 decision-making under uncertainty, for example through science-policy dialogues; improved
692 climate resilience of long-term infrastructure; better integration of the strategy's actions with
693 each other and with the international dimension of adaptation; better monitoring of the
694 implementation of national adaptation strategies and plans; encouraging the establishment of
695 local adaptation strategies in all Member States; and improved analysis of the distributional
696 effects of climate change impacts and adaptation measures. Areas for improvement include,
697 among others, exploiting synergies between climate change adaptation, climate change
698 mitigation and disaster risk reduction; facilitating ecosystem-based adaptation; better
699 mainstreaming in the EU maritime and fisheries policy; reinforcing the links between public
700 health and adaptation; and better adaptation support to investors and insurers, including
701 private investors (EC, 2018c).

702 Climate-proofing of EU action mainly includes mainstreaming adaptation in key vulnerable
703 sectors. The adaptation strategy explicitly refers to the Common Agricultural Policy, the
704 Cohesion Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy, but progress has been made as well in
705 mainstreaming into disaster risk reduction, water, urban and development cooperation policies.
706 A full list of EU policy initiatives where adaptation is mainstreamed, or is being mainstreamed,
707 is available in Annex XI of the Staff Working Document (EC, 2018b). Adaptation is also
708 mainstreamed in the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action,
709 which was adopted in December 2018. This Regulation ensures that the National Energy and
710 Climate Plans to be submitted by the Member States in the future include climate adaptation
711 components where applicable (EU, 2018b). A recent report by the European Court of Auditors
712 found that the EU Floods Directive had positive effects overall, but that the implementation of
713 flood prevention measures suffers from weaknesses in allocating funding and that much fuller
714 integration of climate change into flood risk management is needed (ECA, 2018).

715 *[Editorial note: The following paragraph will be updated in April 2019, following the launch of*
716 *the revised Climate-ADAPT website.]*

717 Better informed decision making, with a central role for Climate-ADAPT⁽³⁾ is also an objective of
718 the EU Adaptation Strategy. Climate-ADAPT aims to provide a common European knowledge
719 base to support a better informed decision making on adaptation; in April 2019 it contained xxx
720 database items, xxx case studies and had xxx subscribers to its newsletter across Europe. With
721 a growing number of countries implementing adaptation action plans, the information provided
722 by Climate-ADAPT shifts to knowledge on the implementation and monitoring of adaptation and

⁽³⁾ <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/>



723 the development of appropriate indicator sets, e.g. by improving the Adaptation Support Tool⁽⁴⁾,
724 and a branding as a first-stop shop for adaptation information in Europe, complementary to the
725 national adaptation portals (EEA, 2018i).

726 The Copernicus Climate Change Service (C3S)⁽⁵⁾ provides an increasing amount of data on past
727 and projected climate change freely to scientists, policymakers and stakeholders. Of particular
728 relevance for adaptation decision-makers is the C3S Sectoral Information System, which is
729 currently under development.

730 *Adaptation efforts of EEA member countries*

731 *[Editorial comment: The final report will include a more comprehensive reporting of findings from*
732 *the ‘horizontal’ assessment included in the evaluation of the EU Adaptation Strategy.]*

733 Adaptation to climate change involves increasing societies’ resilience to extreme climate-related
734 events as well as to gradual changes in climate. The effectiveness and efficiency of many national
735 adaptation policies can only be assessed in the long term, and even then an exact assessment is
736 impossible due to the lack of a counterfactual. Consequently, there are no legally binding
737 quantitative objectives and targets regarding adaptation at European level. Besides the
738 requirements for the national communications to the UNFCCC, the only mandatory reporting
739 for EU Member States on Adaptation comes from the Regulation on a mechanism for monitoring
740 and reporting greenhouse gas emissions (MMR Regulation, EU, 2013, Art. 15). From 2021
741 onwards, mainstreamed in the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate
742 Action, integrated reporting on adaptation actions will be submitted every two years instead of
743 every four years, in accordance with the requirements agreed upon under the UNFCCC and the
744 Paris Agreement, including the Rulebook adopted in December 2018 (UNFCCC, 2015c, 2018; EU,
745 2018b). *[Editorial note: References to these legal documents will be updated once the final*
746 *versions have been published.]*

747 To date, 25 EU Member States and four other EEA member countries have adopted a national
748 adaptation strategy (NAS) (EEA, 2018h), underpinned by climate change vulnerability and risk
749 assessments (EEA, 2018e). In addition, 15 EU Member States and two other EEA member
750 countries have developed a national action plan (NAP) (see Figure 7.12). Since 2013, there has
751 been a steady increase in the number of NASs and NAPs being adopted by countries. Over the
752 same period, several countries adopted a revised NAS (EEA, 2018h).

753 Progress is expected to continue as the EU Member States without a NAS today (Bulgaria,
754 Croatia and Latvia) are in the process of drafting one. It is also expected that additional countries
755 will adopt NAPs and that they will implement more specific adaptation policies and actions in
756 line with their strategies and plans (EC, 2018b, Annex IX).


757 In the Western Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted a Climate Change Adaptation and Low-
758 emission Development Strategy in 2013 (Radusin et al., 2017) and now starts a plan (UNDP,
759 2018), and Serbia is developing a National Plan for Adaptation (Ministry of Environmental
760 Protection, 2017). In addition, a detailed list of proposed priority adaptation measures across
761 sectors is available for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Zdraveva et al., 2014).

⁽⁴⁾ <https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/knowledge/tools/adaptation-support-tool>

⁽⁵⁾ <https://climate.copernicus.eu/>



762 **Figure 7.12** Overview of national adaptation policies



763

764 **Note:** NAS: National Adaptation Strategy; NAP: National Adaptation Plan.

765 **Source:** Adapted from (EEA, 2018h; EC, 2018b).

766 *[Editorial note: This map will be updated to achieve consistency with the EEA Annual Indicator Report 2018*
 767 *(EEA, 2018h) and the 'horizontal assessment' included in the evaluation of the EU Adaptation Strategy*
 768 *(EC, 2018b, Table IX-1). Foreseen changes: IE: NAS and NAP; MT, SE and LI: NAS. Dots for AT, FI, IE, NL, PT,*
 769 *RO and legend label "NAS updated"]*

770 In the EU countries, most vulnerability assessments are made and adaptation options are
 771 identified for agriculture, health, biodiversity, forestry and energy. The main sectors in which
 772 national policy instruments promote adaptation are water, agriculture, biodiversity and
 773 forestry, whereas health and energy are lacking behind. Almost all EU Member States include
 774 transboundary cooperation on adaptation issues in the water sector due to the requirements of
 775 the Water Framework Directive (EU, 2000) and the Floods Directive (EU, 2007), and the
 776 attention given to the topic in the Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's Water Resources (EC, 2012b).
 777 For all other sectors, this is limited to one or a few countries only (EC, 2018b, Annex IX).

778 A limited number of countries have started to monitor and report on adaptation policies and
 779 actions at national level (EEA, 2014a). So far, even fewer countries are evaluating adaptation
 780 policies at national level. The countries that monitor these use mainly 'process-based' methods,
 781 and very few countries use 'outcome-based' approaches to assess if and how vulnerability has
 782 decreased and/or resilience has increased, because such approaches use complex
 783 methodologies and are resource intensive (Mäkinen et al., 2018; EC, 2018b, Annex IX). It will
 784 therefore not be possible to determine with any certainty whether or not decisive progress in
 785 increased resilience can be achieved by 2020.

786 *Adaptation efforts in transnational regions*

787 All European transnational regions are vulnerable to climate change to various degrees. Some
 788 of them, such as the Northern Periphery and Arctic, South West Europe and Mediterranean



789 regions (which include large parts of the Adriatic-Ionian and Balkan-Mediterranean areas) as
790 well as the mountainous part of the Alpine Space, have been identified as ‘hot spots’ (Ramieri
791 et al., 2018; EEA, 2018a). Regions with geographically similar conditions address similar
792 challenges, and the existence of shared resources typically requires common approaches
793 (Rafaelsen et al., 2017; EEA, 2017b, 2018a). The EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change
794 has encouraged all EU Member States to adopt comprehensive adaptation strategies, including
795 cross-border issues. With respect to climate change adaptation, this is reflected in the strategic
796 objectives and actions in all four existing EU macro-regional strategies: for the Baltic Sea, the
797 Danube, the Adriatic and Ionian, and the Alpine regions (EC, 2010, 2012c, 2014, 2015).

798 Common specific transnational adaptation strategies or action plans have also been developed
799 in the North Sea, Northern Periphery and Arctic, Baltic Sea, Danube, Alpine Space and
800 Mediterranean regions, but with different levels of implementation. (Ramieri et al., 2018; EEA,
801 2018a).

802 *Adaptation efforts in cities*

803 *[Editorial comment: The number of actual action plans submitted and those at the monitoring*
804 *stage will be updated in May 2019.]*

805 Whilst the European and national levels provide the political, legislative and financial framework
806 for adaptation, it is important to acknowledge the importance of local adaptation actions
807 addressing the specific situation of particular locations. In 2018, 147 local adaptation strategies
808 were identified across 28 EU countries and Norway (Aguar et al., 2018). However, many more
809 European cities are engaged in initiatives related to climate change adaptation at European and
810 global level. By April 2019, over xxx local authorities in the European region have committed
811 themselves to adaptation within the Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, while xxx
812 action plans are submitted and xxx local authorities have a monitoring programme (Covenant of
813 Mayors, 2018). Other initiatives directly relevant to adaptation are: C40 cities, Making Cities
814 Resilient (UNISDR) and 100 Resilient Cities (Rockefeller Foundation) (EEA, 2017c)⁽⁶⁾.

815 Involvement of cities in one or more of these initiatives may lead to longer-term commitment
816 and action. Moreover, events and information platforms associated with the initiatives facilitate
817 the exchange of knowledge through sharing of examples and lessons learnt (EEA, 2017c;
818 Covenant of Mayors, 2018).

819 Many cities are already putting adaptation measures in practice. Frontrunner cities, such as
820 Copenhagen or Rotterdam, are examples how urban areas can be transformed to meet the
821 adaptation challenge (see also Chapter 17). Others, such as Helsinki, are exploring how
822 adaptation can be monitored (EEA, 2016c). In the absence of national strategies, cities can take
823 the lead on adaptation within countries by adopting and implementing adaptation strategies
824 and plans, such as in the case of Belgrade (Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2017).
825 Conversely, national leadership can ensure that adaptation planning follows the same standards
826 in dozens of cities, as for example in the case of the 44MPA project in Poland (Ministry of the
827 Environment, 2018).

828

⁽⁶⁾ The cities participating in these initiatives are mapped in the Urban Vulnerability Map Book within Climate-ADAPT (<https://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/knowledge/tools/urban-adaptation>)

829 *Summary assessment*830 **Table 7.7** Summary assessment for sub-theme ‘climate change adaptation efforts’

831

Climate change adaptation efforts		
Past trends (10-15 years)		The consideration of climate change at the EU level, the national level and in cities has increased in recent years. Most EEA member countries now have national adaptation strategies and/or action plans.
Outlooks 2030		Further action on climate change adaptation is ongoing or planned at European, national and subnational levels.
Prospects to meet policy objectives/targets	2020 ■	Most, but not all, EU Member States currently have a national adaptation strategy. Implementation of adaptation is still in its early stages in many countries, due to a lack of funding or other barriers. Some countries have started to monitor the implementation of adaptation activities.
Robustness		Process-based information on the planning of adaptation at the national level is available from country reporting to the EEA. Information on the implementation of adaptation at different levels is patchy at best. The assessment of outlooks relies primarily on expert judgement.

832

833 **7.5.3** *Climate change finance*834 Source: Information on [DG CLIMA website](#) and underlying studies.

835 Most measures for mitigating or adapting to climate change require financing, either initially or
 836 permanently. Addressing climate change is to a large extent an investment challenge. Some
 837 measures also involve running costs. Investments in adaptation generally brings local or regional
 838 benefits whereas mitigation investments brings benefits to everyone, because it reduces global
 839 climate change. This section briefly reviews two financial targets related to EU domestic
 840 spending and EU international spending.

841 *EU budget targets*

842 With the intention of mainstreaming climate action into the EU budget, the EU has agreed that
 843 at least 20% of its budget for 2014-2020 should be spent on climate-related action (EC, 2011;
 844 European Council, 2013). Analyses by the Commission indicate that the EU is broadly on track
 845 towards the 20% target, but further efforts are needed (EC, 2016). A report by the European
 846 Court of Auditors acknowledged that ambitious work was underway, and that the target has led
 847 to more, and better focussed, climate action in the European Regional Development Fund and
 848 the Cohesion Fund. At the same time, the report stressed a serious risk that the 20% target will
 849 not be met, and that no significant shift towards climate action has occurred in the areas of
 850 agriculture, rural development and fisheries. The report also emphasized methodological
 851 weaknesses of the current tracking method, including the failure of tracking mitigation and
 852 adaptation spending separately (European Court of Auditors, 2016). Broadly similar conclusions,
 853 and various suggestions for improved climate mainstreaming in the next EU Multiannual
 854 Framework (2021-2027), have been reached in a recent study for DG CLIMA (Forster et al.,
 855 2017).

856 *International climate change finance*

857 In the Copenhagen Accord under the UNFCCC, developed countries have made the collective
 858 commitment to mobilize jointly US\$ 100 billion annually by 2020 to address the mitigation and



859 adaptation needs of developing countries (UNFCCC, 2010). This commitment was reconfirmed
860 and extended in the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015c). However, neither of these agreements
861 includes details on individual contributions between different (groups of) countries, on the
862 shares of public and private finance, and on the ratios of different finance instruments. As a
863 result, reviews regarding the progress towards this target are difficult to conduct, and the results
864 are contentious.

865 A study by the OECD suggested that climate funding for developing countries from public
866 sources had reached US\$44 billion in 2014, up from US\$38 billion in 2013. It projected that public
867 funding would reach US\$67 billion in 2020, including US\$37 of bilateral public finance and US\$30
868 of multilateral public finance. The study found that current estimated levels of private finance
869 mobilization would not be sufficient to reach the US\$100 billion target in 2020, but it stressed
870 that the private finance mobilization may change over time (OECD, 2016). A submission by
871 developed countries and the EU to the UNFCCC, which was largely based on the OECD study,
872 projected that aggregated funding levels for climate action in developing countries would reach
873 more than US\$100 billion in 2020 (UNFCCC, 2016). Further information on the need for and the
874 availability of funds for adaptation in developing countries is available from UNEP (UNEP, 2016).

875 A study by academic and humanitarian organisations has raised criticism regarding these
876 estimates and the underlying methodology, stressing ambiguity in definitions and lack of
877 transparency in reporting (AdaptationWatch, 2016).

878

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